



The Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic 
Relations and the Protocol on the Development of 
Bilateral Relations between the Republic of Armenia 
and the Republic of Turkey (“The Protocols”) were 
signed on October 10, 2009. The Protocols represented 
an unprecedented advancement in relations between 
Turkey and Armenia. However, failure to ratify them was 
a significant bilateral, regional, and international setback.
This article is a diplomatic history of events leading up 
to signing of the Protocols. It assesses the work of Turkish 
and Armenian diplomats negotiating the Protocols and 
the role of Swiss mediation. The monograph evaluates 
ensuing problems, including conditions imposed on 
ratification, as well as the effect of domestic politics in 
Turkey and Armenia on normalization.
At present, Armenia is not a foreign policy priority 
for Ankara. The Protocols may be dormant, yet they 
still provide a roadmap to the way forward. Studying 
the history of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement 
serves as the basis for specific recommendations 
aimed at (i) intensifying civil society activities, (ii) 
expanding commercial cooperation, and (iii) stimulating 
intergovernmental contact.
History
Turks and Armenians are divided by different 
perceptions of history and separated by a border closed to 
travel and trade. Central to their disagreement is the huge 
gap in national perceptions of events that occurred at the 
end of the Ottoman Empire.
Beginning on April 24, 1915, Armenians were 
rounded up and deported. More than a million perished 
between 1915 and 1923. Some Turks dispute these facts, 
underscoring the war context in which events occurred. 
They refer to “shared suffering,” recalling their families 
who fled their homes in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and 
the Black Sea region as the Ottoman Empire collapsed. 
At the beginning of World War I, the Ottoman Empire 
spanned 4.3 million square kilometers. By war's end, it 
was reduced to 770,000 square kilometers. Between 1911 
and 1926, an estimated 2.9 million were either killed or 
forced to migrate to Turkey.1
Turkish-Armenian relations are also influenced by 
the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), an Armenian 
territory placed by Stalin in Soviet Azerbaijan. When the 
Soviet Union broke up in 1991, Armenia and Azerbaijan
declared independence. NK followed by declaring itself 
independent from Azerbaijan in September 1991, resulting 
in full-scale war. NK formally declared independence on 
January 6, 1992. Approximately 900,000 people were 
displaced by the conflict.
Turkey expressed solidarity with its Turkic brethren 
in Azerbaijan by joining Baku's economic blockade of 
Armenia. Though a ceasefire was negotiated in 1994, 
no final peace agreement was reached between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan. Turkey recognized Armenia, but did not 
establish diplomatic relations. Armenia's western border 
with Turkey and its eastern border with Azerbaijan remain 
closed to this day.
Contact
Beginning in June 2000, prominent Turks and 
Armenians, including former diplomats and leading 
Diaspora representatives, held a series of exploratory 
meetings at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. 
The governments of Turkey and Armenia gave their 
tacit approval.2 So-called track two involves contact, 
communication, and cooperation between civil society 
representatives who come together to discuss their 
differences. By engaging private citizens in developing 
ideas and experimenting with solutions, non-state actors 
are able to creatively explore the underlying conditions 
that gave rise to conflict and develop joint strategies for 
addressing shared problems through reciprocal efforts. 
Track two contributes to the development of mutual 
understanding with the goal of transferring insights to 
decision-makers and shaping public opinion. It is not a 
substitute for official diplomacy; however, its flexibility 
helps compensate for the inherent constraints on officials.
The Vienna meetings culminated in the creation 
of the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission 
(TARC), which was announced on July 9, 2001. TARC 
broke the ice. It served as a lightning rod creating space 
for other civil society initiatives. It focused on confidence-
building measures (CBMs), including travel and trade 
between Turkey and Armenia. In addition to catalyzing 
dozens of civil society initiatives, TARC worked with 
the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) to 
“facilitate the provision of an independent legal analysis 
on the applicability of the United Nations Genocide 
Convention to events which occurred during the early 
twentieth century.” The legal analysis presented to TARC
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on February 4, 2003, found that:
International law generally prohibits the 
retroactive application of treaties. The Genocide 
Convention contains no provision mandating 
its retroactive application. To the contrary, the 
text strongly suggests it was intended to impose 
prospective obligations only on the states party 
to it. Therefore, no legal, financial, or territorial 
claim arising out of the events could successfully 
be made against any individual or state under 
the convention.3
The analysis also concluded that “the term genocide 
[...] may be applied to many and varied events that 
occurred prior to entry into force of the Convention.” It 
continued,
As developed by the International Criminal 
Court (whose statute adopts the Convention's 
definition of genocide), the crime of genocide 
has four elements: (1) one or more persons were 
killed; (2) such persons belonged to a particular 
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group; (3) 
the conduct took place as part of a manifest 
pattern of similar conduct against the group; and
(4) the conduct was perpetrated with the intent 
to destroy in whole, or in part, a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group, as such. At least some 
of the perpetrators knew that the consequence of 
their actions would be the destruction of, in whole 
or in part, the Armenians of eastern Anatolia, as 
such, or acted purposefully towards this goal, 
and therefore, possessed the requisite genocidal 
intent. The Events, viewed collectively, can thus 
be said to include all the elements of the crime 
of genocide as defined by the Convention, and 
legal scholars as well as historians, politicians, 
journalists and other people would be justified 
in continuing to so describe them.4
The full impact of the analysis has yet to be realized.
TARC's work was endorsed in a letter to the peoples 
of Turkey and Armenia signed by fifty-three Nobel 
laureates. Organized by Elie Wiesel, recipient of the 
1986 Nobel Prize for Peace, the signatories called on 
Turkey and Armenia to ease tensions “through additional 
treaty arrangements and full diplomatic relations.” It 
also commended civil society initiatives and called 
for normalizing travel and trade between Turkey and 
Armenia, adding: “An open border would greatly 
improve economic conditions for communities on both 
sides of the border and enable human interaction, which 
is essential for mutual understanding.”5
In his 2004 Remembrance Day statement on the 
Armenian genocide, President George W. Bush indicated: 
“On this day I commend individuals in Armenia 
and Turkey who have worked to support peace and 
reconciliation, including through the Turkish-Armenian 
Reconciliation Commission.” In his 2005 statement, Bush 
specifically highlighted the ICTJ-facilitated analysis as a 
way forward on reconciliation.
Joint History Commission
On April 10, 2005, Erdogan sent a letter to 
Kocharian proposing the establishment of a joint history 
commission to study archives and historical records. He 
wrote, “I believe that such an initiative would shed light 
on a disputed period of history and also constitute a step 
towards contributing to the normalization of relations 
between our countries.”6
Erdogan's proposal was intended as a game-changer. 
Not only did he expect that the commission would refute 
the genocide, he also wanted to undermine efforts aimed 
at genocide recognition by demonstrating that Turks and 
Armenians were talking to each other. Ankara resents 
foreign parliaments “legislating history.” As of early 
2012, nineteen countries and the European Parliament 
have recognized the Armenian genocide; Slovenia and 
Switzerland treat denial of genocide as a crime.
Ankara also demands that Armenia recognize its 
existing borders. However, Armenia recognized Turkey's 
borders in the 1921 Treaty of Moscow and the 1922 
Treaty of Kars. Both Turkey and Armenia are members of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), which requires member states to respect the 
territorial integrity of other members.
In response to Erdogan's proposal for a joint 
history commission, Kocharian proposed an official 
intergovernmental commission on all bilateral issues. 
Kocharian's letter of April 25, 2005, indicated, “We have 
proposed and propose again that, without pre-conditions, 
we establish normal relations between our two countries. 
In that context, an intergovernmental commission can 
meet to discuss any and all outstanding issues between 
our two nations, with the aim of resolving them and 
coming to an understanding.”
The exchange of letters resulted in a series of 
exploratory meetings between Turkish and Armenian 
officials. On July 14, 2005, reports surfaced of “secret 
talks” between Turkish Undersecretary Ahmet Uzumcu 
and Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Arman 
Kirakossian in an unnamed European country. A total 
of three meetings were held in Vienna. Ankara insisted 
that no mediators be involved, deliberately seeking to 
exclude U.S. and Russian officials. It also wanted to limit 




The Vienna talks started in mid-2005 and ended the 
following year. An official from Switzerland's European 
Directorate played an informal facilitation role, but 
the meetings were exploratory and Switzerland had 
no mandate. At the final meeting, Uzumcu proposed 
two parallel commissions, one on historical issues and 
another on bilateral matters. He indicated that progress 
in the former would result in Ankara opening its border 
for diplomats to travel. The border would be opened for 
normal travel and trade based on the commission's final 
conclusions. Kirakossian proposed one commission with 
sub-commissions. When Uzumcu rejected this format, 
Yerevan broke off the talks.
Swiss Mediation
Switzerland's Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy- 
Rey was scheduled to visit Ankara in October 2003. The 
Turkish MFA, however, cancelled her visit following a 
decision of the Canton Vaud Swiss Regional Parliament to 
recognize the Armenian genocide. Relations deteriorated 
further when the Lower House of the Swiss Parliament 
recognized the genocide on December 16, 2003.
Switzerland facilitated a meeting between Turkish 
and Armenian officials on the margins of the UN General 
Assembly on September 16, 2007. Michael Ambuhl, 
a highly regarded diplomat and negotiator who was 
serving as State Secretary and Head of the Directorate 
of Political Affairs in Switzerland's Federal Department 
for Foreign Affairs, was the point man. Switzerland's 
role as an honest broker was based on the concept of 
neutrality. Switzerland had recent experience making its 
“good offices” available on Iran and the Russia-Georgia 
conflict. Switzerland also has experience that is relevant 
to Turkey-Armenia issues. It is a small land-locked 
country with 700 years of history as an independent state 
surrounded by big neighbors. Ambuhl was not given 
any specific guidance. He was told to “bring (Turks and 
Armenians) together and do something good. You're just 
not allowed to spoil it.”7
Ankara agreed to broaden the scope of talks to include 
opening and mutual recognition of the borders, as well 
as the establishment of diplomatic relations, if Yerevan 
agreed to the joint historical commission. Professor Jean- 
Francois Bergier briefed both sides. Bergier presented 
his methodology to Kirakossian in Bern, then visited 
Ankara in December 2007 to brief Undersecretary of 
Foreign Affairs Ertugrul Apakan. Bergier's work focused 
on what happened, why, and in what context. He was a 
specialist in the methodology for dealing with the past 
(when memories and historical truths do not overlap).”8 
The Bergier Commission had been established by Swiss 
federal authorities to investigate Switzerland's conduct 
during World War II and its handling of assets by Jewish 
depositors who died during the Holocaust. Bergier was
also highly regarded for his work bridging gaps between 
adversarial parties on a range of historical issues in 
Europe.
In response to Switzerland's concept paper on 
“Dialogue Turkey-Armenia” of September 2007, Ankara 
submitted its views in writing on January 4, 2008. The 
Swiss revised the paper on January 29, and submitted it 
to the Turks and Armenians. Turkish officials focused on 
preliminary ideas for the establishment of a joint history 
commission, insisting that the border could only be 
opened when the commission had been established and 
had started its work. After Ambuhl attended Sarkisian's 
inaugural, he presented both sides with a revised 
Dialogue Turkey-Armenia paper and invited Apakan and 
Kirakossian for their first trilateral meeting on May 21, 
2008.
The meeting was held at an ornate castle in 
Gertzenzee, a hamlet close to Bern, which was taken over 
by Switzerland's central bank and turned into its study 
center. The Turkish delegation at Gertzenzee was led 
by Apakan and included Unal Qevikoz. The Armenian 
delegation was led by Kirakossian and included Armenian 
Ambassador to Switzerland Zohrab Mnatsakanyan and 
its BSEC Representative Karen Mirzoyan. The session 
was a chance to get acquainted, gauge expectations, and 
explore the agenda. It was also an opportunity to define 
Switzerland's role as facilitator. “Both sides rapidly 
agreed that we should take it over,” says Ambuhl. “We 
had an informal mandate. It would have been complicated 
to negotiate a written agreement.”9
At the end of the meeting, Ambuhl issued the 
“Swiss Non-Paper Outline of the Discussion.” The non-
paper indicated that the process sought to achieve the 
“normalization and development of bilateral relations, 
resolving differences and diverging interpretations 
regarding the historical past.” It also called for the 
creation of a “working group to elaborate the modalities 
for the establishment of an historical commission.”
The second meeting in Gertzenzee took place in July 
2008. The parties agreed that their work would focus on 
the establishment of diplomatic relations, normalization, 
mutual recognition, and opening the border, and creation 
of a trilateral commission of experts dealing with the 
historical dimension. Ankara entered into the process and 
was prepared to go along with the first two items, as long 
as the third item was realized. The historical commission 
was its priority. Turkish officials sent Ambuhl a paper 
entitled “Elements of a Tripartite Commission of 
Experts and Historians” on July 23. Three days later, 
Swiss officials finalized their proposal for the tripartite 
commission and presented it to both sides.
Meetings moved from confidence-building to 
substance, addressing the delicate question of sequencing. 
“Slowly, slowly, we prepared the text,” Ambuhl explains.
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“The text was always drafted by us, the Swiss.” The 
third meeting at Gertzenzee was held on September 15. 
Three Protocols became two, with the Protocol on the 
historical commission integrated into the Protocol on the 
Development of Relations. The Protocols were refined 
during ministerial and working-level trilateral meetings 
in New York (September 22-24, 2008), Gertzenzee 
(October 25, 2008), Bern (January 21, 2009), Davos 
(January 27, 2009), and on the margins of the Munich 
Security Conference (February 7, 2009).
U.S. officials were not informed. Switzerland 
cultivates its independence, which is why it is not a 
member of the EU. Washington was kept in the dark, until 
a chance meeting between Apakan and Assistant Secretary 
of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel P. 
Fried in the Lufthansa business lounge at the Munich 
airport in December 2007. Congressional support for 
genocide recognition, the president's annual statement on 
Remembrance Day, and upcoming presidential elections 
made it difficult for the United States to play a mediation 
role.10
Freedom of Expression
Turkish-Armenian contacts occurred against the 
backdrop of international concerns about human rights in 
Turkey, especially Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, 
which criminalizes “insulting Turkish identity.” Nobel 
Prize Laureate Orhan Pamuk and well-known journalists 
-- Murat Belge, Haluk §ahin, Erol Katircioglu, and Hasan 
Cemal of the daily Milliyet -- were charged under Article 
301. So was Hrant Dink, the Turkish-Armenian and 
editor of the Agos.
Dink was assassinated outside his office in Istanbul 
on January 19, 2007. Erdogan expressed his profound 
regret: “A bullet has been fired at democracy and freedom 
of expression.” He called it an “attack on Turkey and 
Turkish unity and stability,” adding that justice would 
be served to “dark hands” behind the incident.11 There 
was also a popular outpouring of support for Dink. Up to 
100,000 people gathered in an eight-kilometer procession 
to the Armenian Church in Kumkapi where his funeral 
service was held. Tens of thousands of Turks rallied with 
placards reading, “We are all Armenians. We are all Hrant 
Dink.” Turks gathered in Taksim Square on April 24, 
2007. Launched on December 15, 2008, the “Apology 
Movement” organized 35,000 signatures on a petition 
stating: “My conscience does not accept the insensitivity 
showed to and the denial of the Great Catastrophe that 
the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915,” and 
offering an apology for their suffering.12
There was a nationalist backlash in response to 
popular sympathy for Dink. Trabzon soccer fans in 
Kamil Ocak Stadium waved banners that read, “We are 
all Turks; we are all Mustafa Kemal.”13 Shots were fired
outside the Armenian Church during a ceremony led by 
Mesrob marking the fortieth day after Dink's murder. 
Prosecutors pressed charges against Dink's son Arat and 
his Agos colleague, Serkis Seropyan, for publishing an 
interview with Hrant Dink about the genocide. A rival 
website was launched entitled “We don't apologize.” 
A service denial attack bombarded the on-line petition 
of the apology movement with millions of messages, 
rendering it inoperable. The Internet attack was traced to 
Turkey's Interior Ministry.
Football Diplomacy
Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul was one of the first 
foreign leaders to congratulate Serge Sarkisian when he 
was elected president on February 19, 2008. His letter 
“broke the ice, extending a new hand to the Armenian 
side.”14 In response, Sarkisian invited Gul to Yerevan to 
watch the World Cup qualifying match between Turkey 
and Armenia on September 6, 2008. Sarkisian's newly- 
appointed foreign minister, Edward Nalbandian, was 
tasked with arrangements.
The Turkish delegation consisted of approximately 
200 people, including business, civil society, and media 
representatives. Hundreds of Armenians lined Gul's 
motorcade route, demanding that Turkey recognize the 
genocide and waving placards that read: “1915—Never 
Again.” They staged a torch vigil at the Armenian 
Genocide Memorial and rallied near the presidential 
palace. Sarkisian and Gul had a private dinner, during 
which Gul reiterated Turkey's proposal to set up a joint 
history commission, as well as other pre-conditions 
to normalization such as resolution of the NK conflict 
and an end to Armenia's campaign to gain international 
recognition of the genocide. In their joint news 
conference before driving together to Hrazdan Stadium, 
neither leader mentioned pre-conditions or obstacles to 
normalization. Turkish officials would, however, use 
the dialogue to deter international recognition efforts, 
warning that recognition would undermine the diplomatic 
process underway with Armenia.
U.S. Approach
On February 1, 2007, Senate Resolution (S Res.) 65 
condemned Dink's assassination, urged Turkey to repeal 
Article 301, and called on Ankara “to act in the interest 
of regional security and prosperity and reestablish full 
diplomatic, political and economic relations with the 
government of Armenia.” H Res. 252 was introduced on 
March 17, 2007. It called on the President “to accurately
characterize the systematic and deliberate annihilation 
of 1,500,000 Armenians as genocide and to recall the
proud history of United States intervention in opposition 
to the Armenian Genocide.” Co-sponsored by more than 
140 members of the U.S. House of Representatives,
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the House International Affairs Committee, chaired by 
Congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA), moved H. Res. 106 
by a vote of 27 to 21 on October 10, 2007. Speaker Nancy 
Pelosi was determined to bring the resolution to the floor 
before Congress adjourned on November 22.
During the 2008 presidential campaign, Barack 
Obama stated, “theArmenian genocide is not an allegation, 
a personal opinion, or a point of view, but rather a widely 
documented fact supported by an overwhelming body 
of historical evidence.”15 Obama called for the United 
States to recognize the genocide on twenty-one separate 
occasions. Joseph R. Biden and Hillary Clinton were also 
on record as repeatedly calling for genocide recognition 
when they served in the U.S. Senate.
Presidential candidates typically call for genocide 
recognition, but then change course upon assuming office. 
While Obama was under strong pressure from Armenian- 
Americans to honor his campaign pledge, he was also 
under pressure from Ankara not to mention the “g-word.” 
At a press conference with Gul in Ankara on April 6, 
2009, Obama said that visiting Turkey just seventy-seven 
days after being inaugurated was a “statement about the 
importance of Turkey, not just to the United States, but to 
the world.” Obama did not use the term “genocide.” His 
written statement indicated, “I have consistently stated 
my own view of what occurred in 1915, and my view 
of that history has not changed. My interest remains the 
achievement of a full, frank and just acknowledgement 
of the facts.”16
Initials
Delinking the normalization of relations between 
Turkey and Armenia from resolution of the NK conflict 
was a procedural breakthrough. According to U.S. 
Ambassador to Turkey James F. Jeffrey, Obama did 
not discuss de-linkage with Gul or Erdogan during 
his April trip. Gul and Erdogan were also silent on 
delinkage. Turkish officials thought it was in the interest 
of the normalization process to allow “constructive 
ambiguity.”17 The Protocols were initialed on April 2, 
and announced by Babacan and Nalbandian in a joint 
statement on April 22.
Obama's April 24 statement referred to “Meds 
Yeghern,” which, literally translated, means “great 
calamity.” Meds Yeghern is used by Armenians as an 
interchangeable term for the genocide. Some Armenians 
were upset because the statement misspelled the Armenian 
term. Turkey's MFA criticized Obama for failing to 
honor Turks killed by Armenians during the period. Gul 
reminded Obama, “everyone's pain must be felt.”18
The text of the Protocols was not made public until 
August 31, 2009. Lack of transparency fueled speculation 
and criticism from within Armenia's governing coalition, 
as well as opposition parties. Armenians also criticized the
timing of the announcement, on the eve of Remembrance 
Day. Turks also criticized the Protocols for selling out the 
interests of Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan's Reaction
According to Mehmet Ali Birand, “Babacan briefed 
[Azerbaijan's President Ilham] Aliyev at least four times, 
but Baku did not take it seriously until the last minute.”19 
U.S. officials also tried to keep Baku informed. Though 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Bryza visited Baku on 
April 15, 2009, to neutralize opposition, Baku denounced 
the Protocols and condemned Turkey for betraying their 
Turkic brethren. According to Fried, “the Azeris had a 
fit.”20
When Ahmet Davutoglu replaced Babacan as foreign 
minister on May 1, 2009, he wanted to negotiate an 
entirely new agreement. Erdogan travelled to Azerbaijan 
on May 12-13, 2009. In Baku he dismissed reports of de-
linkage as “slander” and “disinformation.” He told the 
press, “the Turkey-Armenia border has been closed due 
to Nagorno-Karabakh's occupation and will not be solved 
until it is liberated.”21 Erdogan told the Azerbaijan Grand 
National Assembly on May 13: “The current situation in 
Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be accepted and will never 
be accepted. I want to repeat once more that until the 
occupation ends, the border gates [with Armenia] will 
remain closed.”22
Erdogan's call for a complete withdrawal raised 
the bar higher than the Minsk Group's negotiating 
position, which was focused on a phased withdrawal 
of Armenian forces from areas around NK rather than 
from all territories in Azerbaijan. Presented at the OSCE 
ministerial conference in November 2007 and updated 
in 2009, the Madrid principles of the Minsk Group 
envisioned a settlement based on the return of territories 
surrounding NK to Azerbaijan, a corridor between NK 
and Armenia, self-government guarantees, and a legally 
binding referendum to determine NK's final status.
Turkish officials were surprised by Erdogan's 
demand for a complete withdrawal of Armenian forces 
from all “occupied territories.” Not only was Erdogan 
very emotional during his press conference on May 12, 
but his speech the following day included comments 
that were “not in notes sent by the MFA to the Prime 
Minister's Office.” On this and other important issues, a 
small circle of advisers around the prime minister “made 
recommendations independent of the MFA.”23
“We expected the Protocols would lead to reactivation 
of the Minsk Group,” said Apakan.24 An anonymous 
MFA official indicated that there was “a gentlemen's 
agreement” to that effect. Sure enough, diplomatic 
activity on NK intensified. Sarkisian and Aliyev met for 
two hours on the sidelines of an EU Summit in Prague on 
May 7, and held bilateral meetings with Gul. Erdogan
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went to Moscow after Azerbaijan in order to galvanize 
the Minsk Group. Sarkisian and Aliyev met again in 
St. Petersburg on June 4. In the twelve-month period 
beginning in June 2008, Sarkisian and Aliyev met seven 
times. Ever optimistic, Bryza welcomed “significant 
progress.”25 Ankara's approach eliminated any sense of 
urgency, relieving Baku of pressure to make a deal. Lack 
of progress on NK also relieved Ankara of pressure to 
push for ratification, which would distract the AKP from 
battles on the domestic front.
Beginning in 2007, the government launched an 
investigation of Ergenekon, a clandestine ultranationalist 
network of uniformed and retired military, secular 
dissidents, journalists, and academics. Taraf broke a 
series of stories about extraordinary measures by former 
military officers and members of the deep state intended 
to justify a coup and overthrow the AKP government. The 
military was convinced that Erdogan had a hidden agenda 
to subvert the country's secular system. The AKP's 
electoral victory in elections on July 22, 2007, further 
marginalized the military. So did direct presidential 
elections that Gul won on August 28, 2007, making 
him Turkey's first openly devout Muslim president. 
A referendum on constitutional reform was held on 
September 12, 2010, and approved by nearly 58 percent 
of voters. The referendum was a critical victory, boosting 
the AKP's prospects of winning a third term and fulfilling 
its pledge to do away with the 1982 constitution, which 
was drafted by the military junta.
Signing Ceremony
Fried was replaced as Assistant Secretary by Philip 
H. Gordon. “[Normalization] should proceed within a 
reasonable time frame,” said Gordon. “It means that the 
process can't be infinite. It can't go on forever.”26 On June 
24, 2009, Switzerland drafted a press release announcing 
the text. Both sides took exception to elements of the 
draft, which included only three paragraphs. The release 
was not issued until August 31. On September 1, Calmy- 
Rey joined the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers 
when they announced they would start “internal political 
consultations [to] be completed within six weeks following 
which the Protocols will be signed and submitted to the 
respective Parliaments for ratification. Both sides will 
make their best efforts for the timely progression of the 
ratification in line with their constitutional and legal 
procedures.”27
Negotiating too hard over the press release was 
a harbinger of disagreements to come. The signing 
ceremony was scheduled for the University of Zurich 
on October 10, 2009. Davutoglu and Nalbandian each 
planned remarks to commemorate the “historic moment 
in Turkish-Armenian bilateral relations.” Turkish and 
Armenian negotiators had reached an understanding:
they would avoid open discussion of sensitivities. Neither 
Davutoglu nor Nalbandian would mention the genocide 
or refer to NK.
Thirty minutes before the signing ceremony, which 
was scheduled for 5:00 pm, texts were exchanged through 
the U.S. delegation. Nalbandian was aghast, and refused 
to leave his room at the Dolder Hotel. The Swiss came 
up with a compromise: neither side would make remarks. 
Clinton and Nalbandian drove in the same car to the 
signing ceremony, which was held at 8:00 pm. Clinton, 
Solana, Calmy-Rey, Lavrov, and Kouchner stood behind 
Nalbandian and Davutoglu as witnesses, and as a signal 
of the international community's support. Only Calmy- 
Rey made brief remarks.
Winston Churchill spoke in that same auditorium 
on September 19, 1946, saying: “The first step in the 
recreation of the European family must be a partnership 
between France and Germany.” The historic address 
concluded, “Let Europe rise.”28 The symbolism was 
trenchant. If France and Germany could overcome their 
enmity and Europe could bind together in common 
purpose, then Turkey and Armenia could also overcome 
their differences.
The Protocols
Through the Protocols and the annex, Turkey and 
Armenia agreed to establish diplomatic relations and 
open the common border within two months after the 
entry into force of the Protocol on the Development of 
Relations. In Article 3 and the annex, which Ambuhl calls 
“diplomatic engineering,” the text specifically addressed 
the matter of who would do what, and when. It indicated 
that the signatories:
Agree on the establishment of an 
intergovernmental bilateral commission which 
shall comprise separate sub-commissions for 
the prompt implementation of the commitments 
mentioned in operational paragraph 2 above in 
this Protocol. To prepare the working modalities 
of the intergovernmental commission and its 
sub-commissions, a working group headed by 
the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs shall be 
created 2 months after the day following the 
entry into force of this Protocol. Within 3 months 
after the entry into force of this Protocol, these 
modalities shall be approved at ministerial level. 
The intergovernmental commission shall meet 
for the first time immediately after the adoption 
of the said modalities. The sub-commissions 
shall start their work at the latest 1 month 
thereafter and they shall work continuously until 
the completion of their mandates.
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The parties also agreed to ratify the Protocols in their 
parliaments within a “reasonable time frame.”
While the Protocols described the commitments of 
both parties, they did not take into account their different 
hopes and expectations. According to Apakan, reality 
has two shores.”29 Yerevan viewed the Protocols as a 
way to end the embargo by Turkey and boost Armenia's 
economy. Yerevan expected that the Protocols would 
give a new dynamic and sense of urgency to the Minsk 
Group. The historical commission would buttress the 
genocide's validity, advancing recognition. The Protocols 
also represented a legacy opportunity for Sarkisian, who 
saw the diplomatic breakthrough as a way of securing his 
place in history.
Ankara viewed the Protocols as a way of preempting 
international attempts at genocide recognition, 
undermining allegations of genocide. It anticipated that 
the Protocols would catalyze negotiations returning 
territories to Azerbaijan, ending the NK conflict, and 
laying to rest notions of a “Greater Armenia.” In addition, 
rapprochement with Armenia would put Turkey in good 
stead with the EU.
Azerbaijan's view was unambiguous. Aliyev 
condemned the Protocols, threatening to stop natural gas 
sales to Turkey and to seek alternate routes via Russia, 
Iran, or Georgia. Four days after signing the Protocols, 
Azerbaijan agreed to sell Russia at least 500 million 
cubic meters of gas annually, starting in 2010.30 In a 
blow to Europe's goal of diversifying energy sources, 
Aliyev announced support for Russia's South Stream 
energy project and, in a setback to Nabucco, postponed 
the development of the Shah-Deniz gas field until 2017.31 
Azerbaijan also jacked up the price of gas it sold to 
Turkey.
The Constitutional Court
On November 17, 2009, Sarkissian's government 
asked the Constitutional Court to determine if the 
Protocols conformed to Armenia's constitution and its 
Declaration of Independence that stated: “The Republic 
of Armenia stands in support of the task of achieving 
international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in 
Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia.” Ankara decried 
the move, claiming it was an impediment to ratification. 
It is, however, obligatory in Armenia to get approval 
from the Constitutional Court before proceeding with 
parliamentary ratification of bilateral agreements.
On January 12, 2010, the Constitutional Court upheld 
the Protocols' conformity with the constitution and 
Armenia's Declaration of Independence. The Court also 
ruled that the Protocols placed no obligation on Armenia 
regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.”32 Sarkisian 
announced on February 10, “I guarantee a positive vote in 
parliament if the Turkish side votes without preconditions
and within the timeframe.” Two days later, he sent the 
Protocols to Parliament.33
Erdogan viewed the Constitutional Court's 
involvement as an act of bad faith. On March 16, he 
roiled tensions by threatening to expel Armenians 
working illegally in Turkey. “We are turning a blind 
eye to 100,000 Armenians living [illegally in Turkey],” 
he said. “Tomorrow I may tell these 100,000 to go back 
to their country.”34 To Armenians, his threat evoked 
memories of death marches in 1915. Nalbandian reacted, 
“this statement was a shock for everyone and not only 
in Armenia. The Armenian Genocide started with exactly 
such statements in 1914-1915.”35 Erdogan further 
exacerbated tensions by calling the Statue of Humanity, 
a symbol of Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, “a freak” 
and ordering its dismantling.36
Suspension
Azerbaijan was not invited to the Nuclear Security 
Summit in Washington on April 12-13, 2010. Erdogan 
denounced the genocide resolution during his speech at 
the summit. “We are against a one-sided interpretation 
of history,” Erdogan said. “History cannot be written 
in a parliament or judged by a parliament.”37 Erdogan 
and Sarkisian met for about eighty minutes. However, 
Sarkisian rejected an open-ended process that lead 
“nowhere.” Neither Sarkisian nor Erdogan spoke to the 
press after the meeting.
Obama held bilateral discussions with both leaders.38 
Sarkisian indicated, “we are ready to have normal relations 
with all our neighbors but we will not tolerate someone 
dictating conditions.”39 Erdogan implied flexibility if 
Armenia returned “at least two of the occupied Azeri 
raions (i.e., districts) initially.”40 The districts he proposed 
were the most strategically important.
Sarkisian decided that Armenia could not continue 
the normalization process past April 24, with domestic 
pressure intensifying and opposition parties calling on the 
government to withdraw its signature. “The ball cannot 
remain in one court indefinitely,” said Sarkisian. “Every 
football game has time limits.”41 In his national address 
on April 22, Sarkisian suspended but did not withdraw 
Yerevan's signature.
Clinton praised Sarkisian's decision as “very 
statesmanlike and very impressive.”42 Her visit to 
Yerevan on July 4, 2010, was seen as a signal of support 
for Sarkisian. According to Clinton, “And now, as they 
say in sports, the ball is in the other court.”43
Accountability
A historic opportunity was missed by failing to ratify 
the Protocols. Ankara held the false hope that signing the 
Protocols would fast-track a deal on NK. It also hoped
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that Armenians would stop their campaign for genocide 
recognition. Treaties embody commitments, however, 
not wishful thinking.
Turkish officials did not gauge the intensity of Baku's 
obstructionism to normalization of Turkey-Armenia 
relations, or progress on NK. They underestimated 
Aliyev's willingness to manipulate energy costs and 
supplies, and failed to gauge the impact of the Azerbaijani 
lobby in Turkey.
Senior officials in Turkey's MFA deserve 
commendation for their professionalism throughout 
the negotiations. While Gul displayed vision and 
statesmanship, Erdogan played a different role. Fried 
maintains, “Turkish society was ready, but Erdogan 
didn't lead. Turkey is the greater power and should have 
shown greater wisdom.”44
Yerevan also bears responsibility. Yerevan should 
not have allowed the Protocols to be announced on the 
eve of Genocide Remembrance Day. The timing of the 
announcement galvanized opposition among a broad 
cross section of Armenian society, which believed 
that the Protocols would be manipulated by Ankara 
to undermine genocide recognition. As a result, more 
moderate opposition parties were radicalized.
Both sides failed to adopt a public diplomacy 
strategy, preparing public opinion for compromise. 
Waiting so long to disclose the text was a mistake. Lack of 
transparency fueled speculation. To neutralize opposition 
in Turkey, the Armenian government could have made 
a clear and unambiguous statement that it recognized 
the Turkish-Armenian border. Sarkisian's unwillingness 
to underscore Armenia's respect for Turkey's territorial 
integrity, especially after the Constitutional Court's 
finding, fueled opposition by among Turkish nationalists 
and security establishment.
The United States is also at fault. The Obama 
administration missed an opportunity to reaffirm de-
linkage of the Protocols with NK when Obama visited 
Turkey in April 2009. There was a failure to communicate 
between the U.S. embassies in Ankara and Yerevan. 
As late as the Nuclear Security Summit, U.S. officials 
maintained they had a “plan B.”45 No fallback plan was 
apparent other than convincing Sarkisian to suspend rather 
than withdraw his signature. While Clinton invested her 
personal prestige in Zurich, the Obama administration 
bureaucratized the follow-up. A “Special Envoy for 
Ratification of the Turkey-Armenia Protocols” could 
have played a useful role in maintaining momentum, 
working the system in Washington, and keeping the 
parties focused on next steps rather than pre-conditions.
The Way Forward
The one-hundredth anniversary of the Armenian 
genocide will be marked in 2015. Outstanding issues
between Turkey and Armenia are not going away. 
Leading up to the anniversary, political and moral 
pressures on Turkey are intensifying. There is currently no 
intergovernmental contact. Armenian officials insist there 
is nothing to discuss until Turkey acts on the Protocols.
Representing the stronger power, Erdogan could 
issue an executive order to open the border and normalize 
travel and trade as a step toward diplomatic relations. 
Bolder yet, he could submit the Protocols for ratification 
by the TGNA with his personal endorsement. Prosecution 
or threats of prosecution in Turkey of anyone who 
acknowledges the Armenian genocide should cease, and 
Article 301 should be abolished. Turks should be able to 
discuss their history freely. These steps would be taken 
“in the name of humanity.” Magnanimity is in accordance 
with Islamic principles which enshrine the sanctity of 
life. At this stage of his life, Erdogan should be thinking 
about his legacy and not about scoring political points.
Some significant steps are possible short of 
ratification. The Kars-Gyumri gate could be opened 
allowing train traffic. Turkey has a state-of-the-art fiber 
optic cable that terminates in Kars, and Armenia needs 
access to a fiber optic cable to address growing demand for 
Internet and related services. Armenia has an electricity 
surplus that could be exported to help Turkey power its 
economic development. Textiles and piece goods could 
be manufactured in a Qualifying Industrial Zone, an 
industrial park and a free-trade zone linked to a free-trade 
agreement with the United States for goods benefitting 
both Turkish and Armenian concerns. Both people-to- 
people and commercial contact can be expanded through 
new charter flights between the eastern Turkish city of 
Van and Yerevan. Turkish Airlines could open an office 
in Yerevan to facilitate arrangements. Two hundred 
Armenian trucks travel annually through Turkey via 
Georgia to other countries. Rather than treat Turkey as a 
transit country, the procedure could be amended to allow 
those trucks to off-load in Turkey. Likewise, Turkish 
trucks should be allowed to deliver goods to customers 
in Armenia. Turkish products should be allowed to 
have Armenia as their official destination in the export 
registry, and Armenian products should be treated 
similarly. Linkages should also be established between 
local chambers of commerce and mayors with the goal of 
establishing sister-city relationships and fostering trade 
and investment.
Symbols and monuments can be a catalyst for 
reconciliation. The Ani Bridge across the Akhurian River 
is historically significant for connecting the southern 
Caucasus to the Anatolian plains, and as a symbol of 
Armenian cultural presence in modern-day Turkey. It 
should be restored and opened, at least for tourism. A 
joint committee of Turkish and Armenian restoration 
experts could identify monuments and cultural sites for
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rehabilitation and a research committee of historians 
could identify, assess, and explore arrangements for 
accessing all archives.
Regarding inter-governmental contact, NATO's 
Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center 
is a well-placed platform for expanding cross-border 
exercises enhancing emergency preparedness, with 
the ancillary benefit of building confidence. Turkish- 
Armenian relations should be seen in a broader European 
context. Integration of Turkey and Armenia into the EU 
is ultimately the best structure for normalizing relations 
between Ankara and Yerevan.
The ICTJ-facilitated study on the applicability of 
the Genocide Convention represents a win-win that both 
sides can use to enhance their positions. The legal finding 
should be repositioned as a tool for future dialogue and as 
a roadmap for reconciliation.
The terms “rapprochement” and “reconciliation” are 
often used interchangeably, but they have very different 
meanings. Signing of the Protocols was an event that 
occurred on a specific date, while reconciliation is a 
process that occurs over time. While rapprochement is 
stalled for now, interaction continues. As a safety net, civil 
society is playing a critical role that deserves political and 
financial support. Reconciliation is like riding a bicycle. 
You fall off the moment you stop pedaling.
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